09-05-2018, 07:44 AM
22: Anything that follows from some attribute of God
when it is modified ·or enriched or added to· by a quality
which that same attribute causes to exist necessarily
and to be infinite must itself also exist necessarily and
be infinite.
The demonstration of this proposition proceeds in the
same way as the demonstration of 21. [21 concerns
the likes of: what follows from God’s being extended.
22 concerns the likes of: what follows from God’s involving
motion and rest; this is not extension as such,
extension considered ‘absolutely’, but it necessarily
follows from extension.]
23: Every mode that exists necessarily and is infinite
must have followed either from •the absolute nature of
some attribute of God—·that is, some attribute taken all
by itself·—or from •some attribute that is modified, ·i.e.
enriched or added to·, by a quality that exists necessarily
and is infinite.
A mode is in something other than itself, through
which it must be conceived (by D5), that is (by 15) it is
in God alone and can be conceived only through God.
So if a mode is thought of as existing necessarily and
being infinite, it must be inferred from or perceived
through some attribute of God that is conceived to
express infinity and necessity of existence. It may
follow from •the absolute nature of the attribute—·the
unadorned attribute, so to speak·—or from •the attribute
modified or enriched or added to by some mediating
quality which itself follows from the attribute’s
absolute nature and is therefore (by 22) necessarily
existent and infinite 24: The essence of things produced by God does not
involve existence.
This is evident from D1. For if something’s nature
involves existence, is its own cause, existing only from
the necessity of its own nature, ·and so cannot be
caused by God·.
Corollary to 24: God is the cause not only of things’ beginning
to exist, but also of their continuing to exist.
If we attend to the essence of any caused thing—
not considering whether the thing actually exists or
not—we shall find that this essence involves neither
existence nor duration. So such an essence can’t be
the cause either of the thing’s coming into existence
or of its staying in existence; and the only cause of
both is God (by the first corollary to 14).
25: God is the efficient cause not only of the existence
of things but also of their essence.
Suppose this is wrong. Then God is not the cause
of the essence of things, and so (by A4) the essence
of things can be conceived without God. But (by 15)
this is absurd. Therefore God is also the cause of the
essence of things.
Note on 25: This proposition follows more clearly from 16,
which implies that from the given divine nature both the
essence of things and their existence must necessarily be
inferred; and, in brief, God must be called the cause of
all things in the same sense in which God is said to be
self -caused. This will be established still more clearly from
the following corollary.
Corollary to 25: Particular things are nothing but states of
God’s attributes, or modes by which [= ‘ways in which’] God’s
attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way.
The demonstration is evident from 15 and D5.
26: A thing that has been caused to produce an effect
has necessarily been caused in this way by God; and one
that has not been caused by God cannot cause itself to
produce an effect.
[The demonstration of this is omitted.]
27: A thing that has been caused by God to produce an
effect cannot make itself be uncaused.
This proposition is evident from A3.
28: A particular thing (that is, a thing that is finite
and has a limited existence) can’t exist or be caused
to produce an effect unless it is caused to exist and
produce an effect by another cause that is also finite
and has a limited existence; and the latter can’t exist
or be caused to produce an effect unless it is caused to
exist and produce an effect by yet another. . . and so on,
to infinity.
[Somewhat simplified version of the demonstration:] Anything
that follows necessarily from something infinite and
eternal must itself be infinite and eternal; so something
that is finite and has a limited existence—that
is, a finite item that comes into existence, lasts for
a while, and then goes out of existence—can’t be an
upshot or effect of something infinite and eternal. So
its source must be of the other sort, that is, must be
finite and non-eternal. And that line of thought reapplies
to the latter item, and then to its source, and
so on ad infinitum. Each finite and temporally limited
item is to be thought of not as •something entirely
other than God, but rather as •God-considered-ashaving-
such-and-such-attributes-and-modes.
Note on 28: Certain things had to be produced by God
immediately, namely those that follow necessarily from God’s
nature alone, and others. . . had to be produced through the
mediation of these first things. From this it follows:
I. That God is absolutely the proximate cause of the things
produced immediately by God, and not ·a proximate cause·
in God’s own kind, as they say. For God’s effects can neither
be nor be conceived without their cause (by 15 and 24C).
II. That God cannot properly be called the ‘remote’ cause
of singular things (except perhaps to distinguish them from
things that God has produced immediately, i.e. that follow
from God’s absolute nature). A ‘remote’ cause is one that
isn’t conjoined in any way with its effect; but every existing
thing is in God, and depends on God in such a way that it
can’t exist or be conceived without God.
29: In Nature there is nothing contingent; all things
have been caused by the necessity of the divine nature
to exist and produce an effect in a certain way.
Whatever exists is in God (by 15); and (by 11) God
exists necessarily, not contingently. Next, the modes
of the divine nature—·the ways in which God exists·—
have also followed from that nature necessarily (by
16)—either •following from the divine nature just in
itself (by 21) or •following from it considered as caused
to act in a certain way (by 28). Further, God is the
cause not only of the existence of these modes (by
corollary to 24) but also of their having such-and-such
causal powers. For if they hadn’t been caused by
God, then (by 26) they could not possibly have caused
themselves. And conversely (by 27) if they have been
caused by God, it is impossible that they should
render themselves uncaused. So all things have been
caused from the necessity of the divine nature not only
to exist but to exist in a certain way, and to produce
effects in a certain way; and all of this is necessary,
not contingent. There is nothing contingent.
when it is modified ·or enriched or added to· by a quality
which that same attribute causes to exist necessarily
and to be infinite must itself also exist necessarily and
be infinite.
The demonstration of this proposition proceeds in the
same way as the demonstration of 21. [21 concerns
the likes of: what follows from God’s being extended.
22 concerns the likes of: what follows from God’s involving
motion and rest; this is not extension as such,
extension considered ‘absolutely’, but it necessarily
follows from extension.]
23: Every mode that exists necessarily and is infinite
must have followed either from •the absolute nature of
some attribute of God—·that is, some attribute taken all
by itself·—or from •some attribute that is modified, ·i.e.
enriched or added to·, by a quality that exists necessarily
and is infinite.
A mode is in something other than itself, through
which it must be conceived (by D5), that is (by 15) it is
in God alone and can be conceived only through God.
So if a mode is thought of as existing necessarily and
being infinite, it must be inferred from or perceived
through some attribute of God that is conceived to
express infinity and necessity of existence. It may
follow from •the absolute nature of the attribute—·the
unadorned attribute, so to speak·—or from •the attribute
modified or enriched or added to by some mediating
quality which itself follows from the attribute’s
absolute nature and is therefore (by 22) necessarily
existent and infinite 24: The essence of things produced by God does not
involve existence.
This is evident from D1. For if something’s nature
involves existence, is its own cause, existing only from
the necessity of its own nature, ·and so cannot be
caused by God·.
Corollary to 24: God is the cause not only of things’ beginning
to exist, but also of their continuing to exist.
If we attend to the essence of any caused thing—
not considering whether the thing actually exists or
not—we shall find that this essence involves neither
existence nor duration. So such an essence can’t be
the cause either of the thing’s coming into existence
or of its staying in existence; and the only cause of
both is God (by the first corollary to 14).
25: God is the efficient cause not only of the existence
of things but also of their essence.
Suppose this is wrong. Then God is not the cause
of the essence of things, and so (by A4) the essence
of things can be conceived without God. But (by 15)
this is absurd. Therefore God is also the cause of the
essence of things.
Note on 25: This proposition follows more clearly from 16,
which implies that from the given divine nature both the
essence of things and their existence must necessarily be
inferred; and, in brief, God must be called the cause of
all things in the same sense in which God is said to be
self -caused. This will be established still more clearly from
the following corollary.
Corollary to 25: Particular things are nothing but states of
God’s attributes, or modes by which [= ‘ways in which’] God’s
attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way.
The demonstration is evident from 15 and D5.
26: A thing that has been caused to produce an effect
has necessarily been caused in this way by God; and one
that has not been caused by God cannot cause itself to
produce an effect.
[The demonstration of this is omitted.]
27: A thing that has been caused by God to produce an
effect cannot make itself be uncaused.
This proposition is evident from A3.
28: A particular thing (that is, a thing that is finite
and has a limited existence) can’t exist or be caused
to produce an effect unless it is caused to exist and
produce an effect by another cause that is also finite
and has a limited existence; and the latter can’t exist
or be caused to produce an effect unless it is caused to
exist and produce an effect by yet another. . . and so on,
to infinity.
[Somewhat simplified version of the demonstration:] Anything
that follows necessarily from something infinite and
eternal must itself be infinite and eternal; so something
that is finite and has a limited existence—that
is, a finite item that comes into existence, lasts for
a while, and then goes out of existence—can’t be an
upshot or effect of something infinite and eternal. So
its source must be of the other sort, that is, must be
finite and non-eternal. And that line of thought reapplies
to the latter item, and then to its source, and
so on ad infinitum. Each finite and temporally limited
item is to be thought of not as •something entirely
other than God, but rather as •God-considered-ashaving-
such-and-such-attributes-and-modes.
Note on 28: Certain things had to be produced by God
immediately, namely those that follow necessarily from God’s
nature alone, and others. . . had to be produced through the
mediation of these first things. From this it follows:
I. That God is absolutely the proximate cause of the things
produced immediately by God, and not ·a proximate cause·
in God’s own kind, as they say. For God’s effects can neither
be nor be conceived without their cause (by 15 and 24C).
II. That God cannot properly be called the ‘remote’ cause
of singular things (except perhaps to distinguish them from
things that God has produced immediately, i.e. that follow
from God’s absolute nature). A ‘remote’ cause is one that
isn’t conjoined in any way with its effect; but every existing
thing is in God, and depends on God in such a way that it
can’t exist or be conceived without God.
29: In Nature there is nothing contingent; all things
have been caused by the necessity of the divine nature
to exist and produce an effect in a certain way.
Whatever exists is in God (by 15); and (by 11) God
exists necessarily, not contingently. Next, the modes
of the divine nature—·the ways in which God exists·—
have also followed from that nature necessarily (by
16)—either •following from the divine nature just in
itself (by 21) or •following from it considered as caused
to act in a certain way (by 28). Further, God is the
cause not only of the existence of these modes (by
corollary to 24) but also of their having such-and-such
causal powers. For if they hadn’t been caused by
God, then (by 26) they could not possibly have caused
themselves. And conversely (by 27) if they have been
caused by God, it is impossible that they should
render themselves uncaused. So all things have been
caused from the necessity of the divine nature not only
to exist but to exist in a certain way, and to produce
effects in a certain way; and all of this is necessary,
not contingent. There is nothing contingent.